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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

I

NICK CHOURNOS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
LESri'ER BELL, D. B. STRINGHAM, )
ARLEN BELL, and MEL VIN BROWN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

11079

APPFJLLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
ri'his is an action for wilful trespass in which the
plaintiff landowner seeks an injunction against and damag-es from the defendant deer hunters, who deny plaint i [f's right to control access to and nse of his own privnfrl v own<>d lands.

DI8POSIT10N IN LOvVER COURT
P'ollowing tlw trial of this case to the Court sitting
\\ it!1out a jury on Sqlkrnher 14, 19G7 and filing of memo1

nrnla by hoth eonns('I, the Court t>ntered its Findings

(lj'

Wnd, Cmwlnsions of Law and .Jndgment, holdi:ng that
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a trail or road referred to herein as the ridge road was
not a public way and that defendants were guilty of a
trespass by traveling upon said road. However, tlw
Court also held that a road or trail referred to herein
as the Davenport Canyon road is a public road and the
obstruction of that road hy plaintiff was wrongful, barring recovery of punitive damages. Plaintiff was awarded
compensatory damages of $10.00 for trespass upon thn
ridge road hut costs were assessed against him.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of that part of the judgment which holds that the Davenport Canyon road is a
public way and which denied plaintiff's right to punitive
damages or crn;;ts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is the owner of approximately 20,000 acres
of fenced lands on the east slope of Monte Cristo Mountain in Cache County, Utah, including Sections 15, lG,
22, 27, 28, and 29, Township 9 North, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. ('T. 83). Sections 20 and
21 in that township are federally mvrn'd, and a spring·
kno-\vn as Buck Springs is located within SPction 20
about one-qnartc'r mik sonthwt>st of the southwest eorn<>r
of vlaintiff's SPction 16.

er. 8:3, Pl. Exh. 7).

All grazing-

rights in tlw Huek Springs an'a an' lPaf'P(l Pxe1nsi\'e1y
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to plaintiff by the United States Forest Service for
a thrPe-month period Pach year.
Enck Springs can he reached from the south by fourdrive vehicles over a trail which originates upon
plaintiff's property and which divides to become the
ridge mad and Dannport Canyon road. The area may
also be reached from the north through Blacksmith Fork
Canyon. (T. 45). A road from the west comes within onehalf mile of Buck Springs but does not extend to the
:-:pring itself. (T. 8!5).
wh(~P l

The ridge road was opened and used by plaintiff
1YhPn he homesteaded part of this property in 1932. Both
tlw ridge road and the Davenport Canyon road were
thrn and are now necessary for the movement of sheep
camps in the normal herding of plaintiff's five bands of
:-:lwep. Plaintiff, alone, has maintained these roads for
this 1mrpose, and occasionally he has hired men to help
with this work. (T.172-178). No otlwr stockrnen use these
roads except whf•n trading labor with plaintiff or locating stray sheep which have wandPrPd to plaintiff's herds.
( '11. 21 G, 217). No otlwr grazing pPrmittees of the National Forest have stock drivPways on, across, or through
plaintiff's lands. (T. 216).
TirnbPr lta:s

i1Pver

lwPn ltarvPsted from this area, so

Uw roads \Yf'I'P nevPr hnilt nor used for that pnrposP.

('I'. 4:\). Nor do the roads ronn0ct highways or romrnnn-

ities; they only provide access to Buck Springs for plaintiff, his herds, sheep camps, and employees. Forest Service personnel also have used the roads with plaintiff'~
rxpress perrrnss10n.
For many years the plaintiff expressly permitted
rertain deer hunters to hunt and travel upon his lands.
However, due to the improving and paving of Utah Highway 39 from Ogden to W oodrnff, plaintiff's property
for the first time became easil,\· accessible to large mnnh<'rs of iwople wl10 had not vreviously hunted there.
Also the dPvelopnwnt and widespread ownership of fourwheel drive trucks and jeeps for the first time permitted
large numbers of hunters to travel by vehicle to places
to which they formerly had not gone except on foot or
h,\· saddle horse. (T. 75). For example, defendant Lester
Ht>ll testified that prior to 1955 he rode to Buck Springs
l>~· saddle horse but that since that year he has gone
hy automobile because of the convenience to himself.
(T. 194).
In addition to such greater accessibility of plainti t'f's lands, the proper authorities have in recent years
authorized different classes of hunting and extended and
multiple hunting seasons for various game birds and

animals, thus greatly extending the period of inconveni<·nce and interference with vlaintiff's sheep business.
]~ow-and-arrow hunting for deer, for example, begins in

.\ ngust. There is a three-month chukar and partridgP
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season, a sage hen season, a pine hen season, a regular
deer season followed by elk season, and, occasionally,
a late deer season. (T. 37, 73).
A vastly increased personal injury danger brought
on by the increased number of hunts and hunters was
forcefull~v brought home to plaintiff in about 1954 when
his son John was shot and wounded by a deer hunter.
(T. 41, 72). About two years later a bullet was also
fired into one of the plaintiff's buildings, just over the
heads of his employees. (T. 41-42).
Also, over the past few years plaintiff sustained loss
to personal property when hunters killed his sheep and
Rtole his gasoline during the hunting season. (T. 72, 108,
110). Plaintiff's ewes, managed in five separate bands,
have been repeatedly chased and stampeded about, causing them to lose flesh, trample feed, and become separated from their lambs. When forage is so trampled, it
loses its value as livestock feed and cannot be profitably
utilized that season. (T. 73, 108, 162). This loss of foruge and the increased fire hazard were discussed on cross
«xamination b~' defendants' witness Clark Anderson,
United 8tatPs J<'orest 8ervirt> 8upervisor of the area during the period from 1939 to 1966:
''. .. Roy Stoker often went ... down into these
deer camps (at Burk Springs) to get a license
number off of a camp or advise them to clean
np the an•a or during the deer season to be careful
with fin'. T mean dnring the <leer season.

Q:

That's a real hazard, is it not?

A: Yes. And the littering and the fire hazard
was the main reason for - I wouldn't say servicing. It was mainly to visit the people and solicit
their cooperation.

Q: It's a fact, Clark, is it not, of your own
observation that this use has increased tremendously since you first went up there in 1932?
A:

l should say.

Q: And that hazard now has multiplied many
fold over what it was then?
A:

\' <->ry much.

Q: Both as to sheep and to the forage. vVould
you, Clark, as a man who actually has been in
charge of the use of this forage, agree with tlw
testimony of Nick that ·when you spook these sheep
and cause them to move rapidly in fresh feed areas
they practically destroy it?
A: They surely fix it so that the sheep coming
hehind them vvon't do anything except pick at it.
Of cours(', they g<->t som<-> use at it, bnt it's rni11imnrn.

Q:

Mayhe tPn lJPr c<->nt of what they otlwrwisP
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A:

They damage the forage.

Q:

Substantially, don't they~

A:

Substantially." (R. 1G2).

rrhe fire hazard mentioned threatens the plaintiff's range,
his liHstock, and his home. (T. G3, 89, 107, 162).
The transcript is replete with evidence of damage
done by hunten; traveling upon plaintiff's roads, necessary to the movement of his sheep camps. During dry
hunting seasons, traffic on the roads causes dust to rise
from the road and settle upon the forage, making it unpalatable until washed by rain. (T. 105). And in wet
hunting seasons the hunters' four-wheel drive vehicles,
with chains applied to all four wheels, cut deep ruts in
the roads, making them impassable except to similar vehicles and opening them to serious erosion. ( T. 33, 38, 76,
108, 154-55). No governmental unit provides maintenance for these roads, so the plaintiff is obliged to repair
tlwm at his own expense so he can use them, even though
liP carefully avoids traveling upon them during wet
weatlwr. (T. 81). The plaintiff testified:
You know these four-wheel drives are made
to be off the road and not on the road very often,
and they go, these four-wheel drives, any place to
pick up a dPer ~where we had to pick it up on a
~:ad<llP horse, and now these guys never have no

"A :
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horse any more. That's the way they pick their
deer up. So any time you make a track you're
going to cause erosion. You can't help it. I can
take you np there and show you roads now where
they claim this is part of the roads. What do the1
when it's wet? Wln:. '
do in the fall of the year
.
they're that deep now. Yon can't hardly get out
of the rut. Just because, making these tracks and
washing out all the time, that's what hap1wns
wh0n it rains.

Q: Is it possible for touring cars to use this
particular road ·we're talking about?
A: It's almost too high-center now for pickups,
let alonP an automobile. It's impossible.
Q: Has this road been - the ruts in the road ht>-en d(•epened by thf'se deer hunters, including tlH'
defendants?- Made deeper, the rub:;?
A: r:l'hat's just what they do. It doesn't help
any. That's exactly ·what they're doing. It don't
make no difference how wet the roads are. Yon
can't get over there and hack with a two-wheel
drive, but these four-wheel drives, they pnt four
chains on it and they get over therf' and hack, hnt
they jnRt tear everything U]J.

Q: \:Vhen it is wet, is it ofh n wet dnrinp; tlw
fall hunting ReaRon '?
1

Q:

And when that condition PXiRtR I ask ~'OU if
;.;t:i ~·off tlw road ymn·;.;(•l!'.

:-·011

A: We don't go down it unless we absolutely
have to. We don't drive nothing on these roads."
(T. 75, 76).
As a result of the overwhelming and rapidly multiplying difficulties set forth above, plaintiff in 1964 de(·]ared his lands closed to hunting. He published notices
in local papers and posted his property with appropriate
i'igns.

er. Hi, 78).

He posted a large sign at the cattle

p:mtrd entering his property and stretched a cable with
:,:i.!!,'n attached across the road leading to the ridge and
Davc•nport Canyon roads. (rr. 77, 78, 87).
During the 1965 deer hunting season, defendants
LPster Bell and Arlen Bell were apprehended by plaintiff's agents, Sam Chournos and Thain Grow, going
around the end of this cable as they were returning to
Utah Highway 39 in their four-wheel drive vehicle. (T. 5,
fi, :iO). They ·wt>re at that time informed that they were

tn·spassing and ·were requested to cease. The following
.\·<'ar dPf Pndants B('ll and Stringham were encountered
at Buck Springs by Sam Chournos and Robert Whitney
who had follm\'Pd tlwir vf'hicles' tracks in the snow. All
dd<'rnlants had crosst>d plaintiff's land, again circling the
('ahlP, to enter and ]Pave Buck Springs b)7 thP ridge road.
(rl'. ~:!. l!l9). As a rPsnlt. plaintiff initiated this action.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE RIDGE ROAD WAS NOT A PUBLIC WAY BUT
ERRED IN RULING THE DAVENPORT CANYON
ROAD HAD BEEN DEDICATED TO PUBLIC USE.

After hearing the evidence, the Trial Court found,

inter alia:
"In view of the fact that the said Davenport Canyon Road is shown on a map which was made
as early as 1889, the Court finds that said road,
within the bottom of Davenport Canyon is a public
road.... " (R. 48).
This map (Def. Exh. 18) was identified by defendants' witness Zuberbuhler of the United States Forest
Service. On direct examination he described the important landmarks appearing on the map thusly:

"Q: Does that show 8ections 27 and 28 in the
townships you've indicatP<l '~
A:

1t doP:-;.

Q: And does it show the trails m th<~ an•a at
that timP?

A:

1t dot>i'.
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Q: And on Sections 27 and 28, does it show a
road and a

trail~

A: It shows a road running . . . in a general
northerly direction through Section 27 and a trail
taking off to the northwest into Section 21." (R.
119, 120), (Emphasis addPd.)
The road spoken of is the Ogden-Woodruff road,
Utah Highway 39, which has since been much improved.
r:I:'lw trail is that which the Court now declares a public
mad.
On cross examination the witness reiterated his
statement that the broken line shown on the exhibit extending from Section 27 into Section 21 was a trail and
not a road. (T. 127). He also testified that the originators of the trail could not be identified, and he could
not say whether they were human, livestock, or game
animals. (T. 128, 130). Nothing on the map indicates the
width of the trail (T. 129) or, obviously, the frequency
of its use. The exhibit (Def. Exh. 18) relied upon, as
HtarkPd in purplP b~' Mr. Zuberbuhler, shows that this
troil ended at the center of Section 21 and did not contimw to Huck Springs, approximately one rmle distant
in the northeast qnarter of Section 20. This distance is
:;;iµ;nifirant bPcanse it shows that approximately half of
iii<"

pn•spnt Davenport Canyon road was not even in exist-

('ll<'t'

tlic'

at tlw

fo1w

of the

mm

survPy. Yet tJ1P Court used

smTPY al'\ tlw hnsis for deelaring the entirP road to
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be public. This in no way changes the fact that the
more recent maps, as would be expected, show that the
road established for the first time by the plaintiff goes
all the way to Buck SpringR.
Defendants' witness Clark Anderson testified that
so far as he knows there -was no road down Davenport
Canyon wlwre he firnt WPnt there in 1932. (T. 165).
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that only a trail exists even
yet, although four-wheel drive vehicles and "tote gates"
ean travel npon it.
!10, 58).

er.

Upon this incomplete and unsatisfactory evidence
the Lower Court drew the inference that this road had
been continuously used by the public since prior to 1878
and upon that basis implied a dedication of the road
through its entire length to a perpetual public use. The
more probable inferenees under all the circumstances are
that this trail was a game trail or a livestock trail used
hy livestoek or livestoekrnen claiming private rights to
the immediate an--a. Nothing in the rt>cord will support
a finding of the rPquisitP ten yPars' continuous use as

a pnhli<' thorougl1farP as r<'qnirPd hy statute, Utah CodP
An not. ( 19!):1) '.27-12-89. 1'l 1P \rnrd t710ro11,r1hfare, rnwd
in the statuk, irnpli<'S a road lPading from on<> cornrnunit.'· to anotlwr. rl1his Conrt stated in Lindsay La11d
and Li?:esfock Com7Jr111.11
T)ac. G4G (19:10):

1.'.

(}71011rnos,

7;) Utah 38"1, 285
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""YVe think the evidence established a general pitb-

lic itse of the road. If the claim rested alone upon

the use of the road for sawmill purposes or for
the trailing of sheep, the question would be more
difficult. Bid here the road connected two points
between which there was occasion for considerable public travel. The road was a public con-

venience." (Emphasis added.)

Rimilarly in Jeremy v. Bertagrwle, 101 Utah 1, 116
P2d 420 (1940), involving the East Canyon Road which
connects United States Highways 30 (S) and 40, the
Court found from the record that the road was used by
ranchers, stockmen, owners of adjacent property, and
by the public generally for all convenient purposes, induding pedestrian, equestrian, and vehicular traffic.
rrhis case is clearly distinguishable, for the Court here
fonnd a trail to be public that ended in a remote section
of public domain without receiving any evidence of the
use to which the trail was placed, the continuity and
frequency of use, or the classes of persons using the
trail. Had it joined two communities, as in Lindsay,
supra, and Boyer v. Clark, 7 U2d 395, 236 P2d 107
(1958), an inference that a connecting road was publicly
wwd would be justified since the requirements of citizens of communities dictate continuous travel back and
forth. 1'his inference cannot arise concerning the use
of the Davenport Canyon trail prior to 1879, however,
a::; no snch needs are or could be shown. This Court
in Hoyer, supra, emphasized the statutory requirement
111at nsng-<> he co11ti 111w11s. There is no evidence concern-
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ing the Davenport Canyon road to show a continuous use
except by plaintiff. Defendants made only a "half a
dozen" trips across this road dnring the last ten or elevPn
years. (T. 200). \\There, as here, an encroachment and
interference with private property is songht to be approved, such a use shonld not he assumed without PvidencP. ri1}Wr(' is none hPl'l'.
A road to he public must be clcdicated by its owner
to public use. Such a dedication may be oral or written
or inferred from circumstances, but, in all cases, it must
hf~ shown that the landowner knew of the public use and
intended to grant the right-of-way to the public. Morris
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, mt P 1127 (19Hi); Hall v. North
Ogdrn City, 109 Utah 325, 175 P2d 703 (1946). Nothing
could he further from the fact in this case. It is clear
that neither plaintiff nor his predecessors dedicated the
road for th<> use of the pnhlic. Prior to 1964 persons on
his lands wPre there b.v invitation, and a private right
cannot lw made public so!Pl)r hy tlw intent of the user~
absPnt the m•cpssar:-· intPnt of tlw mvnPr. As to usage by
adjoining landownPrs and Fol'<•st Hervice officials, their
use was private in nature and could not ripen into a public use. Morris 1'. Blunt, supra. Fnrtlwrmore, a pnblir
use as a trail for travPI on foot or on horseback cannot
he the hasis for a pnhlie roadwa:-· for motor vehieh•s.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING COSTS
TO PLAINTIFF AND IN REFUSING TO ASSESS
PUNITIVE DAJHAGE AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
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The findings show plainly the court's reason for
assessmg costs to plaintiff and refusing him punitive
damages:
It is further concluded that the . . . Davenport
Canyon road was and is a public road and plaintiff vrns without lawful authority to prohibit defendants from the use of said road....

*

* *

Since the said cable obstruction placed by plaintiff across the said Davenport road was unlawful,
he is not entitled to any punitive damages against
the defendants .... " (R. 49, 50).

It is appellant's position that the court's premise was
faulty and the result was accordingly incorrect.
This jurisdiction allows the assessment of punitive
or f'xemplary damage for willful and malicious trespass.
Pouwrs v. Taylor, 14 U. 2d 152, 379 P. 2d 380 (1963).
'Chat case involved a trespass by defendant's horses
following protests by plaintiff. The court there pointed
out that one reason for such damages is the warning
mine to others. Cf., Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156,
'.247 P. 2d 431 (1952). This is especially applicable in the
instant situation since the plaintiff is put to great trouble
and Pxpense to protect his rights and without some such
aid hY. the leo-al
sYstem,
the prosecution of each unb
.
dd<'nvd trespasser may become an unbearable financial
~train upon th<~ lanclowner and afford him only illusory
!'(jl i pf.
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That the dPfendants' actions were willful and malicious can be seen by their tPstimony. Each year they
saw and deliberately went around plaintiff's no hunting no trespassing signs and the cable. (T. 202). Each year
defendants Bell were contaeted by plaintiff's agents and
informed on their trespass hut tlH•y refnsed to stop trespassing. 1'1H• Bells' experi<>rn·e in 19G5 ,,-as related to
defendant 8tringham lrnt lH' neYertheless joined in thP
1966 trespass.
201, 20:2). Defendants Bell saw the
printed notices the plaintiff placed in local newspapers
( T. lG) but, that notwithstanding, they and the other
defendant continued to go upon plaintiff's property without permission and they expressed to plaintiff's ag<>nts
their intention to continue doing so.

er.

Upon the erroneous premis(~ that the Davenport
Canyon road was public, the trial court assessed to plaintiff the costs of the action. Plaintiff was entitled to
pn~vail, as noted above, on the issue of his right to
exclude defendants from his lands and plaintiff slwul<l,
therefor(~, have lwen awarded his costs.
( ~ONC'L1TS1 ON

1'he jndg1rn-'nt of tlw trial court m declaring tlw
Da,renport Can~·on road to lw pnhlie \\·as Nroneons. ]t
is not supportPd hy tlw p\·i<l('1we in this n·cord. 1t siionld
he rPvers<•d as a matter of la\\· as slwnld also tlw related
eonclnsion that plaintiff <'onkl not re<·ovPr <>xe111plary
<larnaµ;es or <·nsts.
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Respectfully submitted,
Milton A. Oman and H. James Clegg
Seventh Floor, Continental
Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

